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journals dedicated to philosophy of religion, none from this journaL ...
The book jacket proclaims that the collection presents a diverse collection of arguments for the stunning conclusion that God does not
exist," but what it presents would in no way stun readers who have kept
up with theistic philosophy of religion during the period that these
essays were written. Recent theism is less preoccupied with defending
classical definitions and are more preoccupied with probability arguments, the evidential argument from evil, religious pluralism vs inclusivism or exclusivism, debates over whether beliefs in atheism can themselves be rationally justified, debates over the adequacy of materialist
accounts of consciousness, whether religious experience can be taken as
cognitive, whether it is rational to accept religious views as basic, and so
on. Some of the authors whose contributions have been collected in this
volume have also written arguments against the improbability of
revised versions of theism. I would hope that the editors would follow
up with a collection of articles addressed to these other issues.
II

Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry, by Jerome Gellman.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. Pp. ix and 148. Price $84.95 (hardback); $24.95
(paperback).
KAI-MAN KW AN, Hong Kong Baptist University
The Argument from Religious/Mystical Experience for the existence of
God (hereafter ARE) has been reformulated rigorously by analytic
philosophers like Richard Swinburne, Keith Yandell and William Alston
in the past few decades. Since then it has attracted a lot of critical discussions among professional philosophers. Jerome Gellman, a professor in
the Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel, has emerged as one of
the ablest contemporary defenders of this argument. In his first book on
religious experience, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief,
Gellman defends the strong rationality of trusting the validity of experiences of God, and responds to many objections. Gellman now thinks
that the strong ARE, which concludes that we should be taking mystical
experiences of God as evidence for their validity until shown otherwise,
is vulnerable to criticism because it depends on a controversial thesis,
strong-foundationalism. So Gellman reformulates the ARE in weakfoundationalist terms.
This book has six chapters. After introducing the issue in chapter one,
Gellman spells out the outline of his revised ARE in chapter two. Strong
foundationalism maintains that a sensory belief is sufficiently justified by
the relevant sensory experience independent of any confirming beliefs
or evidence. For Gellman, this position seems to be too strong. In contrast, weak foundationalism, while still maintaining that a belief is justified somewhat by the relevant sensory experience, the latter's evidential
support on its own is not sufficient. It requires support by other experiences. For example, my present impression that I see a tree gives me ini-
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tial evidential sufficiency together with the rich background of perceptions of trees, and of other objects, by myself and by others. My present
belief gains support by the accumulation of past experiences (p. 23).
With weak foundationalism, a plausible ARE must come up with
crosschecks confirming a present perception of God or with reason to
think crosschecks, if performed, would be successful. This would provide reason to think that perceptions of God were evidentially acceptable at least until proven otherwise. So the case for mystical experience
of God must be built on the entire history of perceptions of God rather
than mystical experiences considered as isolated episodes. However,
Gellman rightly points out that we should not tie our notion of confirming evidence or crosscheck to that associated with sensory perception,
and to make physical-object claims our evidential standard. It is because
"Our ordinary physical-object beliefs are way overjustified by confirming evidence. We have extremely luxurious constellations of confirming
networks there. Hence it does not follow that were mystical claims justified to a lesser degree than that, or not by similar procedure, that they
would be unjustified" (p. 27). Gellman has made an excellent point here,
which is relevant to most objections to the ARE. Many critics point out
the ways in which religious experiences differ from sensory experiences,
and then argue, sometimes convincingly, that religious experiences are
justified to a lesser extent than sensory experiences. However, they then
hastily conclude that religious experiences are therefore unjustified. This
is a non sequitur; it is like arguing that since a scientist is less brilliant
than Einstein, he must be an incompetent scientist.
Gellman believes that we need to "judge the extent of confirming evidence for individual perceptions of God on its own terms, by what is
appropriate to it" (p. 27). This is provided mainly by the numbers, diversity and vividness of mystical experience. Each mystical perception carries some positive evidential value, but on its own it is not sufficient.
However, the accumulative weight of numerous such experiences over
time and across cultures, together with the prevalence of "ordinary"
people haVing experiences of a "higher power," should not be ignored.
Moreover, various kinds of checking procedures can be applied to mystical experience. For example, the following factors count towards the
veridicality of a mystical experience: its vividness, profundity and
sweetness, achievement of self-nullification, positive influence of the
subject on society, etc. On the other hand, we should dismiss mystical
experiences which are pathological, staged, unduly influenced by social
pressures, or conducive to an evil, egocentric life, etc. (pp. 28-32).
Of course, the prima facie evidential force of mystical experience might
be overridden by defeaters. In the remaining four chapters, Gellman
proceeds to rebut many commonly offered defeaters of the ARE. (The
following is only a very sketchy summary.) In chapter three, Gellman
responds to Richard Gale who argues that for an object to be qualified as
a perceptual particular, we must be able to understand what it means for
the object to exist when not perceived. Physical objects satisfy this condition because they have spatial-temporal locations. In contrast, God does
not have dimensionality. So God could not possibly be a perceptual par-
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ticular (p. 41). Moreover, the non-dimensionality of God makes the reidentification of God impossible because re-identification is possible
only if the alleged perceptual particular exists in something at least analogous to space and time. For example, being in different spaces at the
same time implies numerical distinctness even if there is perceptual
identity. In reply, Gellman points out that while dimensionality would
be sufficient to give meaning to the very notion of an object's existing
unperceived, it is hardly necessary. The idea of God as having a continuous inner life suffices to give content to the concept of God's existence
unperceived (p. 41). Furthermore, Gale's insistence that the reidentification of God needs to conform to our practice of reidentifying physical
objects is unjustified. Gellman argues that reidentifying physical objects
is a 'holistic' practice: "we make the determination of the space an object
occupies relative to reidentification of surrounding objects, while at the
same time reidentification of surrounding objects depends on a judgment as to what space is occupied" (p. 43). For example, I decide that the
streetlight in front of my house is the same one that was there yesterday
because it occupies the same place. However, I decide it is the same
place because I think it is in front of my same house, on the same stretch
of the same street, and so on. This in turn depends upon determining
they occupy the same place they occupied yesterday, and so on (p. 44).
Since our practice of reidentifying physical objects is in the end circular, we should not exclude the possibility of there being a holistic practice specific to the reidentification of God, with its own criteria like the
seeming constancy of God's character, and God's 'auto-identification."
"We are not obligated to link the very notion of having evidence for a
perceptual particular to the specific holistic practice of reidentifying
physical objects" (p. 44). To buttress this point, Gellman appeals to
Strawson's purely auditory world, in which the distinction between
numerical and qualitative identity in a world is based on the pitch of a
master-sound.
In chapter four, after examining the nature of reductionist explanations of mystical experience, and criticizing the disappearance theory of
God-perceptions, Gellman focuses on Matthew Bagger's criticisms.
Bagger complains that the ARE presupposes an unacceptable kind of
explanation, i.e., supernatural explanation. Bagger believes that epistemic values are culturally relative, and there are no timeless canons of
explanatory goodness. Since we now live in a modern age, we have to
judge the acceptability of supernatural explanation with reference to
modern epistemic values. Since Bagger believes that the "quintessentially modern inquirer" can only accept naturalistic explanations, the ARE
which presupposes supernatural explanations must be rejected. In reply,
Gellman points out that for tens of millions of religious devotees in
modern societies, supernatural explanation is alive and well, and Bagger
has also ignored the movement of 'new spirituality' in Western countries. So the secularists who exclude supernatural explanation are only
one subculture which exists alongside many others in modern societies.
Furthermore, on Bagger's conventionalist position, it is difficult to justify
an a priori rejection of supernatural explanation. "To reject alternatives
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solely because they are not the dominant mode of explanation would be
to wield conventionalism unjustly as a protective strategy of a most conservative kind" (p. 71). (Gellman also suggests that a defender of the
Argument from Perception might offer a non-interventionist conception
of genuine God-perceptions. However, I doubt that this move will fully
pacify a thorough-going naturalist like Bagger.)
In chapter five, Gellman considers whether sociological and neuropsychological explanations of mystical experience can serve as
defeaters of the ARE. For example, Evan Fales builds on the studies by
the anthropologist I. M. Lewis on spirit possession, and suggests that
mysticism serves as a means of access to political and social power. Fales
thinks that this sociological understanding of mystical experience is
superior to the theistic explanation. Gellman responds by producing
counterexamples to Fales' theory. In the cases of mystics like Jacob
Boehme (1575-1624), Abraham the son of Maimonides (1186-1237), Baal
Shem Tov (1698-1760), and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), their
mystical experiences have little to do with their attainment of power.
Moreover, there is the phenomenon of non-institutionalized mysticism:
mystical possession is often independent of social institutions, or the
mystic is not well-placed for access to power. Gellman further argues
that even if Fales' theory were convincing, it would not be successful as
a defeater. Suppose the mystics did manage to achieve improvements
for their marginalized group by force of their mystical authority.
Gellman asks, "Isn't it fitting for God to appear to people for the relief of
oppression and injustice?"
Gellman also considers Eugene d' Aquili and Andrew Newberg's neurophysiological theory of mysticism. They explain mystical states as the
effect of 'deafferentiation' - the cutting off of neural input into various
structures of the nervous system. For example, to explain passive meditation, they propose that the intent to clear the mind of content sets off
an intricate system of deafferentiation within the brain that results in
ecstatic and blissful feelings via intense stimulation of structures both in
the lateral hypothalamus and in the median forebrain area. A consequent neutralizing of the posterior superior parietal lobule, responsible
for spatial coordination of incoming stimuli, creates a sense of 'pure
space' experienced as absolute unity or wholeness. Together, the patterns set up in the brain create an overwhelming experience of 'absolute
unitary being' (p. 95). In similar fashions, the theory proposes explanations of a continuum of mystical experiences, both theistic and non-theistic. While Gellman notes that d' Aquili and Newberg themselves caution against a reductionist reading of their theory, he points out that the
d' Aquili-Newberg theory does carry reductionist pressure concerning
experiences specifically of God.
To rebut the attempt to take this kind of neurophysiological theory of
religious experience as a defeater of the ARE, Gellman raises several
points. First, the theory fails to take seriously enough the perceptual
character of mystical experiences of God. "Instead, it treats such experiences as composed entirely of a cluster of subjective feelings waiting to
be interpreted by the subject as a perceptual episode" (p. 98). However,
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mystical experience of God is not merely a matter of feelings. So "its
neuropsychological tale cannot be the whole story. At best, it accounts
for the physiological basis for the affective concomitants of mystical
experiences" (p. 98). Second, the neuropsychological theory is not
incompatible with the idea that God is the external ultimate cause of
those mystical experiences. In fact we should have expected that a nonsensory perception of God would involve unique brain events. So the
neurophysiological theory by itself does not defeat a theistic explanation
(p. 99). Here Gellman has interesting observations about what types of
neuropsychological theory would overcome the evidential weight of the
mystical experiences. During the process he raises deep questions that
deserve further exploration.
In chapter six, Gellman addresses feminists who query the entire analytic approach to mysticism. They argue that by focusing upon private,
individual experiences in mysticism, the philosopher ignores social and
structural ills, e.g. oppression of women (pp. 103ff). They regard concepts like "experience," "evidence," and "rationality" as androcentric
constructions which are used to mask the interests of upper middle-class
white Western males (p. 109). In response, Gellman questions whether
there is empirical evidence for the contention that treating mysticism as
"private" reflects a desire to repress women by consigning them to a private sphere. Although the proponents of the ARE focuses on the epistemology of mystical experiences, it does not imply a denial of justice to
women (p. 106). Gellman agrees that "philosophers should be open to
the richness of content and texture of women's experiences and interpretations" (p. 110), but he thinks this can be construed realistically rather
than relativistically. In the end, even feminists cannot get away from the
fact that our experiences do have evidential relevance. We know, for
example, from experience that white male bias infects the concept of
"objectivity."
In the end Gellman only draws a modest conclusion. He admits that
the ARE is not universally rationally compelling, in the sense of rationally obligating all who would ponder it to accept it. Despite Gellman's
rebuttal of the alleged defeaters (e.g., the inadmissibility of supernatural
explanation, gender objections), it seems to me Gellman still grants that
the critics can rationally hold on to those "defeaters." However, Gellman
emphasizes that those" defeaters" have not been shown to be rationally
compelling for everyone either. So the ARE "is a line of reasoning that
can be held (only) by some in a rational way that confers evidential sufficiency on the phenomenon of perceptions of God" (p. 52).
I think Gellman's attempt to defend a modest form of ARE is largely
successful, and his replies to various objections are in general cogent.
The significance of Gellman's work should be understood in light of his
contribution to a new research project in philosophy of religion and
epistemology. Swinburne, Alston and Gellman are not only reviving
natural theology; they are also proposing a new epistemological
approach which navigates between strong foundationalism and postmodern relativism. They admit our epistemic base is fallible but they
advocate an attitude of prima facie trust to replace Cartesian doubt. While
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"trust without infallible proof" used to be treated as irrational, now they
suggest the spirit of rationality should be construed as "trust until
shown otherwise by criticisms." They maintain the emphasis on experience but try to break loose of the straigh~acket of traditional empiricism
by broadening the evidential base of experience. The basic rationale is
that in the end we need to adopt an initial attitude of basic or fundamental
trust (i.e., a trust that can't be non-circularly justified) towards our perceptual experiences. In that case, it would be unfair to grant this kind of
basic trust to sense experiences alone while adopting initial skepticism
towards other kinds of perceptual experiences. This is nothing other
than the construction of a radically new epistemology, which takes the
Principle of Critical Trust (hereafter PCT) as a fundamental principle of
justification / rationali ty (I prefer this name to "the Princi pIe of
Credulity"). Together with the efforts of Swinburne, Alston, Yandell,
Caroline Davis, etc., Gellman, by effectively rebutting the common
objections to this new approach in his two books, has helped to show
that this new epistemology of religious experience is at least more
viable, and more resistant to refutation than many critics think.
In fact, given Gellman's rebuttal of the objections, I wonder whether
some of his concessions are necessary. For example, Gellman grants that
those for whom supernatural explanation is not an explanatory option
can rationally reject the ARE. For me, this rejection is only rational in the
very weak sense of "not capable of being conclusively disproved." This
move seems to lack positive epistemic justification, and the underlying
motivation is basically a dogmatic presupposition of naturalism. Similar
things can be said about those who think God's non-dimensionality
automatically disqualifies him from being a perceptual particular. This
seems to betray a kind of epistemic chauvinism by taking sense experience to be the only standard. I am also puzzled by Gellman's final concession to the feminist objections. I think his reply has sufficiently shown
that while God-perceptions may have been misused in their traditional
context, it does not follow that their evidential force is then completely
annulled. While I also think that the naturalistic explanation objection
cannot successfully defeat the ARE (at least at this moment), I do think it
ought to be taken more seriously. In fact Gellman's discussions do show
a kind of ambivalence about this issue. This is also likely to be the major
battleground where the proponents and the critics of the ARE will meet.
Gellman wants to mount the ARE on the basis of weak foundationalism rather than strong foundationalism. To clarify the issue, let me note
that the Principle of Critical Trust (PCT) can be formulated in several
ways:
(generic PCT)

Every perceptual experience of X provides some
justification of belief in the existence of X.

(strong PCT)

Every perceptual experience of X provides prima
facie justification of belief in the existence of X that
is sufficient in the absence of defeaters.
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Every perceptual experience of X provides some
but less than sufficient justification of belief in the
existence of X.

The strong PCT is incompatible with the weak PCT but both entail the
generic PCT. Because Gellman seems to be swayed by the criticisms of
Levinson and Malino, and Fales, he wants to withdraw his previous
support of the strong PCT. Instead, he thinks that the ARE on the basis
of the weak PCT is easier to defend. I agree that the weak PCT may look
more reasonable and less controversial to more people. So if ARE can be
defended in this form, it increases the argument's appeal and persuasive
power. In this sense Gellman's attempt to work out a revised ARE is
commendable. In fact Gellman is not the first one to suggest this revision
of ARE. Gary Gutting and David Brown have similar proposals, and
William Lycan holds to a form of weak PCT (though he does not apply it
to religious experience). However, I am not entirely certain that the
strong PCT is completely indefensible.
Basically, Levinson and Malino argue that a perception of any kind
enjoys initial evidential sufficiency only when there are intersubjective
tests for the veridicality of the perception, which have been performed
and turned out positive, or which there is reason to believe would turn
out positive if they were performed. Fales argues that crosscheckability
must be integral parts of any perceptual epistemic practice before we can
take it on trust. So the strong PCT is mistaken. Well, this issue is not new
and long time ago C. B. Martin forcefully voiced this objection: "the
presence of a piece of blue paper is not to be read off from my experience as a piece of blue paper. Other things are relevant: What would a
photograph reveal? Can I touch it? What do others see?" However, the
equally trenchant reply by Mavrodes has brought out the problems with
this kind of objection:
"Suppose that I do try to photograph the paper. What then?
Martin asks, "What would a photograph reveal?" To discover
what the photograph reveals I would ordinarily look at it. But if
the presence of blue paper is not to be "read off" from my experience then the presence of a photograph, and a fortiori what the photograph reveals, is not to be read off from my experience either. It
begins to look as though I must take a photograph of the photograph, and so on ... The same sort of thing happens if I try to determine "what others see." I send for my friend to look at the paper ...
But his presence is not to be read off from my experience either.
Perhaps I must have a third man to tell me whether the second has
come and the infinite regress appears again. Interpreted in this
way, Martin's thesis fails because it converts into a general requirement something that makes sense only as an occasional procedure.
At most we can substitute one unchecked experience for another."
Inter-subjective tests and crosschecks are good things to have but the
problem is that all these checks are ultimately circular in the sense that
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their reliability has to be presupposed if they are to do any useful work.
If the strong peT cannot be applied to an isolated perception and hence
the latter has to be kept in suspense, how can the other perceptions help
if their epistemic status is equally insecure? Should we not also keep
them in suspense? Furthermore, to bring the past record of testing to
bear on an isolated experience, we have to trust our memory. The skeptical question will rise again here: why can we trust this memory before
extensive testing? This memory should then be crosschecked with other
memories or perceptions but then what about those? The circle goes on
and on and I am not sure the ensuing project of epistemic justification
will be promising.
Of course the above discussions have only scratched the surface of the
epistemic Pandora's box. If the strong peT is defensible, this will only
strengthen the ARE. Anyway, the strong peT is controversial and
Gellman's constructive employment of the weaker peT is welcome.
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